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1 Local Economic Development 
Incentives in the United States
 
The jury is still out on whether economic development
policies have any effect at all.
 
—Therese J. McGuire (1992)
 
One of the most important policy issues facing major metropolitan
areas in the United States now—and for at least the past three
decades—is economic development.  The overall distribution of busi-
ness activity within a metropolitan area, the retention of existing eco-
nomic activity, and the attraction of new economic activity to central
cities and inner suburbs are all of concern.  The concern stems from the
relationships that exist between many of the most pressing urban prob-
lems, such as crime, poverty, unemployment, blight, deteriorating
infrastructure, and fiscal stress and from the continued redistribution of
employment and residence from central cities and inner suburbs to




  Redistribution of economic activity
within most metropolitan areas has also created the labor market issue
of a spatial mismatch between low-skilled employees residing in cen-
tral cities and inner suburbs and potential employers located increas-
ingly farther out in urban areas.
Policymakers of affected cities have not been content to let this
shift in economic activity go uncontested and have responded with a
host of incentives designed to alter location decisions.  Local business
incentives have taken a number of forms: tax forgiveness, tax incre-
ment finance authorities (TIFAs), industrial development bonds
(IDBs), municipal land acquisition, establishment of development




  Since the 1970s, the
use of such locally initiated incentives has increased dramatically
throughout the United States.  While most of these incentives are
aimed at lowering the cost of business capital within a specific jurisdic-
tion, they are also offered in a desire to increase employment opportu-
nities for city residents.  After all, who has not heard the three reasons
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most often cited by politicians to justify a local economic development
incentive program: jobs, jobs, and jobs.
Bartik (1991a and 1994) has offered an equity- and efficiency-
based argument in favor of  local incentives to business.  The equity
side concerns business location responses to intrametropolitan tax dif-
ferentials that impose greater costs on some communities.  Due to high
property taxation and inadequate business services, many firms choose
not to locate in a community that is also likely to have a greater number
of poor people within its boundaries.  The result is a higher level of
local taxes paid by the poor, a lower level of local public services pro-
vided to them, and reduced employment opportunities for those most
in need.   An offering of local development incentives may counteract
this regressive chain of events.
The efficiency side of Bartik’s argument is the use of local eco-
nomic incentives to correct the market failure of the mispricing of the
value of an additional local job in a city experiencing high unemploy-
ment.  In a perfectly efficient world, workers in any city are paid a
wage equal to the value they place on alternative uses of their time.  In
this efficient world, an additional job generates local tax revenue
equivalent to the increase in local public services that accompany the
new job.  Bartik argues that, in the real world, cities that have high
unemployment may enjoy greater social benefits from an additional
local job than cities with low unemployment.  High unemployment cit-
ies are also more likely to have underused public infrastructure (streets
and parks) and services (police and firefighters).  An additional job
poses little additional public cost to such a city.  Bartik argues that a
local incentive that redirects a job from a low unemployment city to a
high unemployment city is efficient in the sense of correcting the mis-
priced market signal that exists without it.
As states have provided their local governments with the ability to
grant economic development incentives, local tax revenue has been
foregone in an effort to attract business capital and employment.  Suc-
cess in the use of development incentives could be defined as directing
economic development to areas where it would not otherwise have
occurred.  If local incentives achieve this goal, the foregone revenue
may well be justified.  If not, communities have simply given away tax
revenue to the benefit of the business recipients’ bottom line.  Further-
more, if such inducements have become the primary way that commu-
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nities compete with one another to attract capital and employment—as
is more likely to be the case within a metropolitan area—it is appropri-
ate to ask whether such competition is good public policy.  It may be
quite reasonable from the point of view of policymakers in one com-
munity to grant a tax incentive in hopes of attracting productive capital
and employment within its boundaries.  However, if all other commu-
nities in the region grant the same identical incentive, there is no redi-
rection of business activity. 
This book is a detailed examination of the use and effectiveness of
local economic development incentives within a region or metropolitan
area.  Our analysis focuses on an important and large U.S. metropolitan
area, that of Detroit.  We have made this choice because, for over 20
years, the Detroit area has grappled with the use of a wide array of
local economic development incentives. Metropolitan Detroit provides
a rich laboratory in which to investigate the adoption, use, and effec-
tiveness of such incentives.  Our experience in conducting research on
urban fiscal issues leads us to believe that our methodology, findings,
and policy suggestions are relevant to other U.S. metropolitan areas as
well.
Our goal is to enrich the public policy debate on the degree to
which local economic development incentives have helped to create
economic opportunities in cities.  We are also interested in revealing
the factors that drive one city to offer more of a particular form of a
local economic development incentive than what another city is offer-
ing.  Our intended audience is educated laypersons, policymakers, and
researchers.  We employ the appropriate economic theory and statisti-
cal methods but place particularly technical procedures in appendixes
so that the body of the monograph is accessible to the nontechnician.
We have structured this study to emphasize clear policy appraisals and
recommendations.  If one is not particularly interested in a detailed
account of earlier research on local economic development incentives
and spatial mismatch, we recommend that Chapter 2 be skipped or just
briefly reviewed.
As readers of policy tracts ourselves, we have always found it
enticing to sample major results without having to plow through an
entire book.  For the Detroit metropolitan area, we find that the offering
of most local economic development incentives (holding all else con-
stant) has increased over time.  A city providing more of one type of
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such incentives is also more likely to offer more of other types of local
incentives.  We find little to support the notion that increased manufac-
turing or commercial property value in a city in a metropolitan area
(holding all else constant) raises the employment rate of residents in a
city.  However, we do see evidence that increased manufacturing or
commercial property value in a city decreases the percentage of the
city’s residents that live in poverty.  If increased manufacturing or com-
mercial property value reduces a city’s poverty rate, then perhaps a
local economic development incentive that increases nonresidential
property value can be used to counteract spatial mismatch and to
decrease local poverty.  We do in fact find that the establishment of a
TIFA or a downtown development authority (DDA) district in the aver-
age city in the Detroit area in any of the observed years increased the
commercial value of property in the city.  In addition, the granting of
property tax abatements to manufacturing property prior to 1977
exerted a positive influence on local manufacturing property value.
The use of manufacturing property tax abatements in other years, and
of IDBs and commercial property tax abatements in any year, exerted
no positive influence on local nonresidential property values.  The
remainder of this book is about the details and policy implications
associated with these broad findings.
The next section of this introductory chapter contains a brief back-
ground on economic development incentives in the United States.  We
review only local incentives that are designed to reduce the cost of
doing business in a city.  We do not consider local activities to increase
the human capital of a city’s residents, regenerate mature industries,
and/or apply new technology.  These tools of economic development




  This chapter also contains a discussion
of why intraregional local incentive offers merit independent study,
evidence on the intraregional use of incentives in the United States and
metropolitan Detroit, and an outline of the contents of remaining chap-
ters.
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U.S. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES
 
The widespread use of direct financial incentives by the
states demonstrates the degree to which they have become
partners with private business in the development process.
 
—National Association of State
 Development Agencies (1991)
 
 
Although the active use of state-sanctioned incentives to attract
economic development began in the mid 1970s, local governments
have always devoted a portion of their borrowing ability and infrastruc-




  Early initiatives of
this type were primarily directed to accommodating the growth of pop-
ulation into undeveloped areas and facilitating the commerce that fol-
lowed.  
By creating the Balance Agriculture with Industry Program in
1936, Mississippi was the first state to actively encourage private
industrial development through publicly sanctioned activity.  The
incentive employed was the issuance of industrial development bonds.
A state or local government issues the IDBs, but the revenue stream of
the private project backs the bonds.  This arrangement takes advantage
of the tax-exempt status granted municipal debt.  Although initially
challenged in courts, IDBs have been upheld as constitutionally appro-
priate.  By the 1960s, most states had authorized the use of IDBs in
some form to attract business investment.  Since 1968, Congress has
increasingly placed restrictions on the ability of state and local govern-
ments to issue private purpose IDBs.  In response, a few states in the




  In 1991, Missis-
sippi and South Carolina were the only states that recognized the local
issue of a taxable bond backed by the assets of a private endeavor.
By 1991, the options available to states for the inducement of eco-
nomic development had grown to the list provided in Table 1.1.  In
addition to allowing IDBs, three states (Louisiana, North Dakota, and
Tennessee) permitted the use of general obligation bonds by local gov-
ernments to finance private industrial development.  The full faith and
credit of the issuing government back general obligation bonds.   In
Michigan, this form of municipal bond can only be used for state-sanc-
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tioned private projects.  General obligation bonds issued by govern-
ments for private purposes have primarily been used by communities
desiring to establish a labor-intensive manufacturing base, or, as in the
case of Michigan, to retain large manufacturers.
To facilitate the attraction and retention of small businesses, in




, or composite, issue of one industrial
development bond.  The proceeds of such an issue are used by the state
to meet the financing needs of more than one enterprise.  Another bond
innovation was the guarantee by six states to pay outstanding principal
and interest on bond issues in case of default.  To address constitutional
questions raised by this backing, the full faith and credit of the state are
not committed to the guarantee.  A separate reserve account is instead
established.
According to the National Association of State Development
Agencies (NASDA 1991), second to IDBs, in terms of the number of
states that allow them, are direct loans or grants by a state or local gov-
ernment.   Similar to the criteria for a private loan, an application and
 
Table 1.1 Economic Development Incentives Offered 
within the United States
 
Manufacturing revenue bonds (tax exempt)
Manufacturing revenue bonds (taxable)
General obligation bonds
Umbrella bonds




State-funded equity/venture capital corporations





SOURCE: NASDA (1983 and 1991).
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independent evaluation are required.  In the 24 states that facilitate eco-
nomic activity this way, resources include the umbrella issue of an
IDB, a one-time appropriation from the state general fund, or a revolv-
ing fund in which new loans are financed through prior loan repay-
ments.  A similar business incentive was created in the 20 states that
guarantee private loans or offer interest subsidies.
Start-up companies have a greater risk associated with achieving
success, but they also offer the prospect of greater employment oppor-
tunities.  As a result, 18 states had established state-funded or state-
chartered equity/venture capital corporations by 1991.  In addition, 10
states had created privately sponsored credit corporations that assist
small businesses.  Although credit corporations are mostly funded from
private sources, they are authorized by state legislation and follow state
guidelines.
In one way or another, the incentive programs described thus far
are all geared to attract economic development to a state by reducing
the business cost of machinery, buildings, and land.  As a result of the
increasing sophistication required of labor in most current production
processes, 45 states have also designed state-run manufacturing train-
ing programs as a way to recruit new manufacturing activity.  Criteria
for eligibility for most of these programs stipulate that employees vol-
unteer and that the employer has job openings of the type sought by the
newly trained.
The most direct method by which a state reduces the cost of doing
business within its boundaries is through a tax incentive.  In the United
States, these have taken the form of tax exemptions, credits, abate-
ments, and special treatments.  In 1991, every state had the option of
providing relief from at least one of its major taxes.  For example, 34
states provide that the inventory held by a business can be at least par-
tially exempt from property taxation.  Minnesota, North Dakota, and
New Jersey also offer some form of exemption or credit toward the
state corporate income tax.  Efforts to conserve energy are granted spe-
cial tax treatment in 27 states, while 38 states offer preferable tax treat-
ment for pollution-control equipment.  A state-based investment tax
credit exists in at least 25 states.  The same number of states offer a
business tax credit or exemption for new job creation.
Local governments could abate or exempt business property from
taxation in 33 states by 1991.  State and/or local governments could
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also exempt a business from sales and use taxes in Illinois, Minnesota,
and New Jersey.  Another form of tax incentive, begun in California in
1952, is the tax increment finance authority.  An authority is estab-
lished and a specific zone within the community is designated where
incremental property tax revenue attributed to the development activity
of the authority is used to fund the purchase and maintenance of the
zone’s infrastructure.  Sometimes the authority also sets up an eco-
nomic development program office.  The stated goal of a TIFA is
increased economic development within a designated geographic area
of a community.  Huddleston (1984) noted that at least 28 states in
1982 allowed cities to establish their own TIFAs.  Chapman (1996)
recorded more recently that at least 44 states and nearly 5,500 local
agencies now use this tool to encourage local economic development.
The final form of direct business incentive offered by states is the
enterprise zone (EZ), which targets activity in designated areas of a
state.  These incentives are usually restricted to areas that have had a
slow rate of development, high unemployment, and/or high welfare
payments per capita.  Tax concessions, tax credits, employee training
programs, and/or the relaxation of environmental or workplace rules
are offered to businesses choosing to locate within these zones.  In
1991, NASDA reported that 28 states had created EZs of some sort.
Subsequently, Ladd (1994) reported that 37 states plus the District of
Columbia had formed EZs.
Our focus is on local government incentives offered within a spec-
ified substate region.  Of the menu of available incentives offered in the
states in Table 1.1, only a few are under the autonomous control of
local governments.  These include the issuance of local manufacturing
revenue bonds, the issuance of local general obligation bonds, the
abatement and exemption of local property taxes or sales/use taxes, and
the establishment of TIFAs.  In most cases, the offering of a local
incentive is also subject to approval of the state.  Even in the absence of
the requirement of specific state approval, states still have a constitu-
tional right to intervene and to restrict the offering of local incentives
by communities that abuse the practice.  Considering the anecdotal evi-
dence observed in Michigan and other states, in most cases the
approval of a local incentive by a state agency is a rubber-stamp pro-
cess.  This is not surprising given the strong tradition of local auton-
omy and home rule that exists in the United States.
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As a final piece of background on the use of local incentives in the
United States, Figure 1.1 shows the number of states that allowed six
specific types of incentive programs in 1983, 1986, and 1991.  These
years were chosen because they correspond to the published dates for
the NASDA Directory of Incentives for Business Investment and
Development in the United States.  This directory offers the only
known reliable source on the use of economic development incentives
in the entire country.  Notice that by 1983 the use of tax-exempt IDBs,
general obligation bonds, and property tax or sales/use tax exemptions
had become well established.  There was little or no growth in the use
of these local incentives by additional states through the early 1990s.
The innovation of IDBs only began in the late 1980s.  Although EZs in
the United States are not a locally controlled incentive, they are also
shown in Figure 1.1 to document their recent rapid rise in popularity.
This increase is discussed in our final policy suggestions.
 
DIFFERENCES IN LOCAL INCENTIVE OFFERS
 
[Economic development] programs aimed at individual
towns or suburbs within a metropolitan area raise different
issues.
 




Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Pol-
icies?
 
 (Bartik 1991b), the author concluded that state and local eco-
nomic development incentives may increase productivity, redistribute
jobs to areas in most need of employment, and increase national
employment.  Bartik made this claim based on a summary of previous
research and on his own study of subnational incentive policies
designed to influence economic activity inside a region (either a state
or metropolitan area).  He used the tentative “may” in his conclusion
because the direct empirical evidence on whether competition for eco-
nomic development causes productivity gains, employment redistribu-
tion to needy areas, and national employment increases was sparse in




Figure 1.1 Number of States That Allowed Specific Incentives in a Given Year
 
SOURCE: NASDA (1983, 1986, and 1991)
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still not enough empirical support, is whether competition for eco-
nomic development causes economic growth in the most needy areas.
The tactic taken here is to examine the effects of incentive offers
made by local governments within a specific metropolitan area.  As
Bartik has noted, this approach raises issues that can be ignored if the
unit of analysis is the entire metropolitan area or state.  We believe,
however, that it is a mistake to ignore these intrametropolitan issues if
one wishes to know whether local incentives do redirect economic
activity to needy areas.  In the 1990s, the places in most need of eco-
nomic revitalization in the United States are central cities and the sur-
rounding inner suburbs.  The concern is not just whether one
metropolitan area or state offers greater (or fewer) development incen-
tives than others, but how the incentive offers are distributed through-
out jurisdictions within a metropolitan area.  Assuming that incentives
can redirect economic activity, a necessary condition for redirection of
activity toward needy areas is that needy areas offer more incentives.
The important difference in incentive offers made by local govern-
ments within a metropolitan area can be derived from the anecdote told
in one form or another by economic development practitioners across
the country.  The management of a business new to a metropolitan
area, or of one already located in the area, is about to make a location
decision.  Management gives the local government leaders an impres-
sion of seriously considering a site within the area’s inner cities, while
the existing business already resides there.  In order to attract the new
business or to retain the existing business, an inner city puts together
an incentive package of local tax breaks, IDBs, and other incentives.
Of course, the cost of doing business in the inner city is likely to be
greater due to higher crime rates, higher taxes, and lower public service
quality.  The inner city policymaker finds it necessary to offer an incen-
tive package as a form of compensating differential.  The mobile busi-
ness firm presents the inner city’s incentive offer to a suburban
municipality and asks for a matching offer.  The firm is able to provide
a fiscal surplus, or an excess of local tax payments over the cost of
local services provided, to the suburban city.  The firm also extends the
promise of additional jobs for the suburban community.  The inner





 the same place it would have most likely gone without the
incentive.
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Such a scenario can also be played out between two states or met-
ropolitan areas competing for a major manufacturing facility.  This
occurred repeatedly in the battles for the locations of auto manufactur-




  The difference in
local incentive offers is that the situation of an offer/counteroffer is
more likely to occur between two competing jurisdictions in a metro-
politan region.  There is more than one reason for this.  First, the non-
fiscal factors that influence a firm’s location decision are prone to be
constant across cities within a region.  Thus, the manipulation of fiscal
factors through incentive offers carries greater weight.  Second, the
arsenal of local incentive tools is necessarily the same between com-
peting cities in a metropolitan region in the same state.  The excuse that
the state does not allow the city to match the competing incentive offer
is not credible.  Third, the proximity of cities within a metropolitan
region makes the transmission of information and the bargaining pro-
cess much easier to accomplish.  A firm shopping for a new site can
negotiate with an inner city in the morning, present the offer to the
outer suburban city in the afternoon, and call for a response by the sub-
urban city council at its meeting that evening.  These three factors com-
bine to force local policymakers to take the threat of alternative sites
and competing incentive packages very seriously.
The unique aspect of communities within a substate area compet-
ing with each other to attract economic development has been recog-
nized by other researchers as well.  Wolman and Spitzley (1996) have
provided an extensive review of the literature on the politics of local
economic development.  The researchers point out that many local offi-
cials perceive their city’s economic performance as being held hostage
to the ease of capital mobility between border cities.  Incentives offer a
tool to combat this mobility.  An environment of uncertainty and turbu-
lence surrounds most local economic development projects and also





A local elected official claims credit for a desirable firm location deci-
sion by offering an incentive that then is attributed as the key factor in
the choice.
Wassmer (1993) pursues a more economic approach that considers
communities in a metropolitan area to be providers of land for business
use.  The issue is whether cities compete or collude with each other in
the provision of land for business use.  It is in the collective interest of
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cities in a metropolitan area to cooperate and to pursue joint incentive
policies through cartel-like allowance of land for business use.  In so
doing, cities maximize the total fiscal surplus extracted from business
in the metropolitan area, although it is still in the interest of any one
city to pursue a noncooperative strategy and to independently offer
local incentives to business.   Wassmer provides empirical evidence
that the norm in the Detroit metropolitan area has not been collusion in
local incentive offers, but local competition that has steadily increased
over time.
 
INTRAREGIONAL USE OF INCENTIVES
 
Although much of the extant literature on public sector
competition for economic development is set at the state
level or examines the competition between major cities, the
fiercest competition for private investment is often between
neighboring cities or cities within the same region.
 
 —Edward Goetz and Terrence Kayser (1993)
 
The previous section presented arguments as to why it is important
to examine the redistribution of economic activity caused by incentive
offers of cities within a metropolitan area.  Next, we review the avail-
able evidence on the degree to which communities in major U.S. met-
ropolitan areas have the potential and have chosen to compete with
each other for economic development by offering incentives.  It is
unfortunate, however, that there really is little direct information to
offer.  A 1991 study of interjurisdictional tax and policy competition
(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1991) con-
cluded that evidence on this issue is lacking due to definition and mea-
surement problems that make it difficult to assess the degree of
competition.
Given the lack of direct data on intrametropolitan incentive compe-
tition in the United States, an alternate method is to ask how much
competition for local economic development could exist between
municipalities in the largest U.S. metropolitan areas?  A key tenet of
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economic theory is that competition is only possible if there are a sub-





  If cities are the suppliers of land for business
use, and business firms are the demanders of that land, then the com-
petitive requirement is satisfied on the demand side, as there are many
business firms in large metropolitan areas of the United States.
Fischel (1981) examined the competitive requirement on the sup-
ply side by applying the notion of concentration ratios to local govern-
ments in large U.S. metropolitan areas.  In the field of economics
known as industrial organization, a common technique is to measure
the percentage of sales in an industry captured by the four largest firms
in the industry (four-firm concentration ratio).  A high percentage indi-
cates greater concentration and hence a lack of competition.  For the 25
largest urbanized areas in the United States in 1970, Fischel calculated
two forms of concentration ratio for the four largest suburbs in each
region.  The first was the total square miles of the four largest cities
divided by the urbanized land area of the Standard Metropolitan Statis-
tical Area (SMSA).  The second was the total square miles of the four
largest cities divided by the land area of the SMSA outside the central





The central cities listed in italic type in Table 1.2 exist in metropol-
itan areas where the two concentration ratios are both less than 40 per-
cent.  In these metropolitan areas, the four largest suburban cities
comprise less than 40 percent of the urbanized land, and less than 40
percent of the suburban land in the total metropolitan area.  A concen-
tration ratio of less than 40 percent is often regarded as a necessary
condition for competition to exist in an industry.  A further condition
for competition is a large number of cities in the metropolitan area.  As
shown in Table 1.2, the metropolitan areas containing the 11 most pop-
ulated cities in the United States (New York to Minneapolis) satisfy the
concentration condition and contain from 58 to 399 cities in their
respective metropolitan areas.  By most standards, this is adequate evi-
dence that these metropolitan areas exhibit competitive markets for
manufacturing and commercial business location.  In addition, the
smaller metropolitan areas of Milwaukee and Cincinnati also meet the
two requirements of low concentration ratios (less than 40 percent) and
a large number of cities.
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In order to assure competition, not only must the structure of local
governments be competitive, but local governments must also have the
capacity to offer local incentives.  Table 1.2 indicates that all the metro-
politan areas that were competitive in structure in 1970 also had the
state-granted ability in 1991 to offer at least one form of local incen-
tive.  Ten of the metropolitan areas were in states that allowed the offer
of two or more forms of these incentives.  The most prevalent type of
local incentive in the large U.S. metropolitan areas defined as competi-
tive was the capability to issue property tax abatements or exemptions.
The comparison between Fischel’s calculation of 1970 concentration
ratios and the 1991 ability to offer local incentives should pose little
problem.  Subsequent change in the number of local governments in




There is evidence of the potential for the competitive use of local
incentives to attract business to specific jurisdictions within the largest
U.S. metropolitan areas.  What about more tangible information on the
degree to which incentives are actually used by localities in large met-
ropolitan areas?  Such material is harder to obtain.  A search of the lit-
erature has yielded only a few examples.  An early review of the
subject by Bahl (1980) reported that the practice of giving local gov-
ernment tax abatements to stimulate commercial and industrial devel-




 that New York City had already foregone $200 million in
annual property tax revenue due to abatements.  Glastris (1989) in 
 
U.S.
News and World Report
 
 called Hoffman Estates, Illinois, “the latest
loser in the tax incentive wars” when it gave an incentive package of
land, infrastructure, tax abatements, and worker training valued at
$240 million to attract the Sears Corporation from Chicago.  Burnier
(1992) provided background on local tax abatement policy in Ohio and
on its implementation in the city of Chillicothe.  She concluded that
officials view tax incentives as a tool of competitiveness that they do
not intend to relinquish.  Reinhard and Scott (1993) reported estimates
from the International Downtown Association of at least 1,000 Down-
town Management Districts in North America at the time.  These dis-
tricts act to spur central business district development as special tax
assessments are used to provide services and infrastructure designed to
retain and attract commercial business.  Finally, in a recent summary of




Table 1.2 Suburban Fragmentation and Local Incentives in Large U.S. Metropolitan Areas
 
Availability of a specific local 





Four largest suburbs concentration











 % of metro area’s
urbanized land  c  
% of metro area’s 
suburban land  d  
Local IDBs













































89 20 23 No Yes Yes
Houston 30 19 72 Yes Yes No
Baltimore 4 75 100 Yes Yes No






41 30 38 Yes No No
Seattle 29 50 69 Yes No No
Miami 22 78 80 Yes Yes No
San Diego 12 32 74 Yes No No




79 14 19 Yes Yes No








25 21 31 Yes Yes No
San Jose 15 27 47 Yes No No
SOURCE: Fischel (1981, Table 1) and NASDA (1991).
 a  This is the number of local governments with final zoning authority.  
b
 












The central cities in italics have concentration ratios less than 40 percent.
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cated that in 1950 there were only two TIFA redevelopment areas in
the state.  By 1990, the number had grown to 658 project areas.  The
assessed value captured by Californian TIFAs in 1990 was nearly 8
percent of the total assessed value of all property in the state.
Wolkoff (1985) noted that, because local incentives are largely
regarded by states as a community matter, few reliable statewide esti-
mates of their use exist.  Researchers who have surveyed local govern-
ments directly have obtained some of the best sources of information.
Cable, Feiock, and Kim (1993) offered the results of a survey of U.S.
cities with populations over 50,000, to which 219 cities responded.  Of
the replying officials, 42 percent of the officials indicated that they
offered tax abatements; 32 percent offered loan subsidies of some sort;
47 percent offered direct loans; 34 percent used cash contributions; and
62 percent offered employee training as local incentives.  Bowman
(1988) surveyed 84 public and private sector economic development
officials in 31 southeastern cities in the United States.  Her purpose
was to gauge the extent and style of interjurisdictional incentive com-
petition among these cities.  Respondents were given the choices of
very competitive, fairly competitive, and not competitive.  Eighty-two
percent of the aggregate group of mayors, business editors, commerce
and economic development staff responded that the level of competi-
tion for economic development in their city was very competitive.
Respondents were given the choices of high, medium, or low to rate
the level of competition with surrounding suburbs.  Forty-seven per-
cent of the mayors responded high, while 35 percent of the business
editors, 19 percent of the chamber staff, and 39 percent of the eco-
nomic development staff did the same.
A Goetz and Kayser (1993) survey deserves special attention.  In
1991, these researchers attempted to contact an economic development
official in all 140 municipalities in the Twin Cities (Minneapolis and
St. Paul) metropolitan area.  In total, 109 surveys on local economic
development practices were returned, of which only 15 reported no
formal local economic development practices.  Of the remaining 31
nonrespondents, 81 percent had populations less than 10,000.  Goetz
and Kayser concluded that the majority of nonrespondents were likely
to have had no formal organization to encourage local economic devel-
opment.  Thus, nearly 70 percent of the communities in this metropoli-
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tan area were engaged in local efforts designed to attract and retain
economic activity.
An aspect of the Goetz and Kayser survey results that warrants
mention here is that 85 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed with the statement that competition for economic development
exists within the region.  However, only about one-half of the respon-
dents said that they were doing well in their competitive efforts to
attract and retain local economic activity.  This is not surprising if eco-
nomic development activity in a region is a zero-sum game.  A telling
finding is that the cities responding as doing well experienced greater
population growth in the last 20 years.  Development officials who
responded that their jurisdictions were not doing well pointed to nega-
tive city characteristics as the cause of their disadvantage.  Most offi-
cials in this situation thought that the appropriate strategy is greater
effort directed at intrametropolitan economic development competition
in the future.
Of special interest in the Goetz and Kayser analysis of the Twin
City survey data was an attempt to determine which cities compete
with each other in a spatial sense.  When asked to name their prime
competitors, nearly every city chose cities nearby and within a nar-
rowly defined subregion in the metropolitan area.  A number of inner
cities and first-ring suburbs said that their competition for local eco-
nomic development was primarily second-ring suburbs.  Interestingly,
second-ring suburbs viewed their competitors differently and saw their
adversaries as other second-ring suburbs within their subregion.  Goetz
and Kayser also used simple correlation analysis and found that munic-
ipalities were more likely to compete with cities of the same popula-
tion and tax revenue size.  Ultimately, 80 percent of the economic
development officials thought that their own local development efforts
provided benefits to the entire Twin Cities region.  At the same time,
only 39 percent thought that local economic development activity
ought to be regionally coordinated.  Considering that an innovative tax
base-sharing plan has long existed in the Twin Cities metropolitan area,
this is a discouraging finding.  It offers little reassurance for potential
metropolitan-wide coordination of local incentive offers even in a
region that is notable for its cooperation.  
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LOCAL INCENTIVES IN METROPOLITAN DETROIT
 
Most [property tax] abatement activity has occurred in the
counties that have served as the traditional sources of
Michigan’s economic strength . . . Wayne County, the state’s
most populous, has had the largest volume of abatement
activity within it.
 
—Michael J. Wolkoff (1982)
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, there is circumstantial
evidence that most large U.S. metropolitan areas possess the local gov-
ernment structure and the state-granted capability to compete with
each other through local incentive offers.  Except for some noteworthy
survey evidence, there is only anecdotal information on the degree to
which specific types of local incentives have been offered by commu-
nities within U.S. metropolitan areas.   Fortunately, the state of Michi-




Michigan has a longer-than-average history of allowing local jurisdic-
tions to choose among a large array of local incentives.  Information on
the use of these incentives has been recorded and reported by various




The menu of local incentives available to Michigan communities
includes industrial development bonds, manufacturing and commercial
property tax abatements, tax increment financing, and downtown
development authorities.  The first IDB offered by a city in metropoli-
tan Detroit occurred in 1967.  As required by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS), the state treasurer’s office has kept a record of all locally
offered IDBs.  Manufacturing property tax abatement has been avail-
able to Michigan communities since 1974.  Commercial property tax
abatement was available to Michigan cities between 1978 and 1988.
The State Tax Commission, within the treasurer’s office, grants final






Two other local incentives available in Michigan are the TIFA and
the DDA.  Michigan municipalities have been able to establish TIFAs
since 1980 and DDAs since 1974.  DDAs are authorized to create and
implement an economic development plan within a city’s central busi-
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ness district.  They often use tax increment financing as a source of
funding.  Groups like the Citizen’s Research Council of Michigan
(1986) and the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (1990)
have kept track of the establishment of TIFAs and DDAs within Michi-
gan jurisdictions.
Using simple descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, Wass-
mer (1993) found empirical evidence of increasing competition in the
use of local incentives in the Detroit metropolitan area over time.  Over
the 10- to 15-year period that local incentives had been available, there
was an average eightfold increase in the mean local use of incentives
and a decrease in the coefficient of variation in use for all forms of
incentives except IDBs. 
In 1995, we published a formal duration analysis of the adoption of
manufacturing property tax abatements by Detroit area municipalities
(Anderson and Wassmer 1995).  Duration analysis allows for the calcu-
lation of the probability that a specific jurisdiction will begin to offer
manufacturing property tax abatements provided that it has not yet
chosen to provide this incentive.  In our statistical analysis, we
employed time-varying covariates and controlled for local characteris-
tics that could influence a city’s decision to offer its first manufacturing
property tax abatement.  The clear finding from this research is that,
the longer a municipality waits to grant a property tax abatement, the
greater the probability that it will offer its first incentive in the next
period.  As time passes, economic and political forces cause a commu-
nity to be increasingly more likely to make an incentive offer.  We
attribute this result to the strategic motivations involved with incentive




The finding of greater incentive emulation over time provides evidence
that the likelihood that a city in a metropolitan area will match a com-
peting city’s inducement increases with the length of time since the




This chapter has provided an overview of economic development
incentives offered by local jurisdictions within U.S. metropolitan areas.
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Our study of this issue is motivated by the relationship between many
of the nation’s most pressing social and economic problems and the
unprecedented redistribution of residency and economic activity that
has occurred in the last 40 years from most of the nation’s inner cities
to their outer suburbs.  As described in detail in O’Sullivan (1999,
Chap. 10), the percentage of the U.S. metropolitan population living in
central cities fell from 64 percent in 1948 to 39 percent in 1990.  The
loss in manufacturing employment over the same period was from 67
percent to 45 percent, while wholesale, retail, and service employment
in central cities fell even further.  In an effort to alter this flow, inner
cities have responded with an arsenal of local fiscal incentives, appar-
ently matched in numerous cases by the outer suburbs.
We have also tried to provide reasons why there has been very little
formal testing of the efficacy of local incentive offers made within a
metropolitan area and to emphasize the importance of studying this
issue further.  We began with a broad background on the types of sub-
national economic development incentives available in the United
States.  Among these, only industrial development bonds, general obli-
gation bonds, property tax abatement, sales tax exemption, and tax
increment financing are locally initiated.  There is little direct data on
the use of these incentives in U.S. metropolitan areas, although an
examination of the largest of these areas showed that they exhibit a
competitive government structure and possess the ability to issue at
least one form of local incentive.  Both anecdotal material and survey
evidence in support of the existence of intrametropolitan competition
were provided.   
In addition, we gave a brief description of local incentive use in
Michigan, specifically in metropolitan Detroit.  A primary reason for
the choice of this area as the subject of our empirical study is the avail-
ability of information on local incentive offers.  In addition, the Detroit
area exhibits a competitive local government structure, a greater-than-
average number of types of state-sanctioned incentives for local gov-
ernments, and the ability to offer these incentives for a period longer
than the average observed in most other states.  Earlier statistical anal-
yses confirm the competitive nature of local incentives in the Detroit
metropolitan area.
Chapter 2 provides the reader with a retrospective on previous
work.  This includes the determinants of local economic activity, previ-
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ous attempts to assess the efficacy of local incentive offers, the issue of
a spatial mismatch between employees and employers in a metropoli-
tan area, and an explanation of how these topics are related in our
study.  Chapter 3 gives a descriptive overview of the types of local
incentives employed in the Detroit metropolitan area and statistical
evidence on a possible spatial mismatch in the area’s labor market.
Chapter 4 reviews economic models and their implications for the
effectiveness of local incentives on employment and capital allocation
decisions by business in a substate region.  A system of simultaneously
determined equations is presented as a framework within which to
examine the effectiveness of local incentives.  The results of regression
estimation of the simultaneous system, and some relevant simulations
that use the regression findings, are in Chapter 5.  Chapter 6 contains a




1. As presented in the 1995 
 
Statistical Abstract of the United States
 
, published by
the U.S. Department of Commerce, 15.6 percent of the U.S. population in 1970
lived in cities with populations of 500,000 or more.  By 1990, this percentage had
fallen to 12.1.  See Downs (1994) for a full description of the relationship between
suburbanization and urban problems in the United States.  As Downs points out,
an additional benefit of the reconcentration of economic activity in a metropolitan
area is less urban sprawl, with less traffic congestion and less air polution.
2. The incentive programs listed are the major ones traditionally offered to business.
Newer forms of economic development programs became popular in the 1980s





 economic development policies are more likely to be initiated at
the state level, and data on their local use are difficult to acquire, this book con-
centrates on the use of traditional incentives.  The National Association of State
Development Agencies (NASDA 1983, pp. 13–20) offers a concise description of
the various forms of nonfinancial assistance offered within states.
3. Consult Fosler (1988) for a thorough discussion of these alternatives.
4. Netzer (1991) makes this point.
5. NASDA (1991, pp. 773–778) provides a list of all the states offering the various
forms of incentives described here.
6. Bartik (1994) recognizes this by concluding, “Competition for jobs among juris-
dictions within the same metropolitan area uses public resources without chang-
ing overall labor market opportunities in the metropolitan area” (p. 857).
7. See Bartik (1987) for an example.
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8. Eberts and Gronbert (1988) have tested the hypothesis that an increased number
of local governments per person leads to a more competitive structure and hence
less expenditure per person (holding all else constant).  They find the expected
result that, the greater the government fragmentation in a metropolitan area, the
lower the local government expenditures per capita within Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas.
9. Fischel (1981) also calculated concentration ratios for the Washington, D.C. met-
ropolitan area.  These are excluded from Table 1.2 due to the area’s overlap with
two states.
10. See Wassmer and Fisher (1997) for a description of city formation in large US.
metropolitan areas and evidence on the minor degree of change between 1980 and
1990.
11. Throughout this book, the Detroit metropolitan area is defined as Macomb, Oak-
land, and Wayne counties.  This is the same as the 1970 U.S. Census definition of
Detroit’s SMSA.  In 1990, the U.S. Census defined the Detroit Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Area (MSA) as containing Lapeer, Livingston, Macomb, Monroe, Oak-
land, St. Claire, and Wayne counties.  We have chosen the more limited 1970
definition because it better accounts for a region where communities are more
likely to compete with each other for the location of many of the same businesses.
12. A complete description of the local incentives offered in the Detroit metropolitan
area is contained in Chapter 3.
13. Wolkoff (1985) has already used this information to provide a summary of manu-
facturing tax abatement awards in Michigan counties up to the mid 1980s.
14. The prisoner’s dilemma is a widely discussed game in the social sciences demon-
strating that, given the inability to coordinate decisions among individuals, the
self-interested choice made by one is not in the interest of all.
